The adoption of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in the aerospace industry offers potential benefits of improved flexibility in function allocation, reduced development costs and improved maintainability. However, it requires a new certification approach. The traditional approach to certification is to prepare monolithic safety cases as bespoke developments for a specific system in a fixed configuration. However, this nullifies the benefits of flexibility and reduced rework claimed of IMA-based systems and will necessitate the development of new safety cases for all possible (current and future) configurations of the architecture. This paper discusses a modular approach to safety case construction, whereby the safety case is partitioned into separable arguments of safety corresponding with the components of the system architecture. Such an approach relies upon properties of the IMA system architecture (such as segregation and location independence) having been established. The paper describes how such properties can be assessed to show that they are met and trade-off performed during architecture definition reusing information and techniques from the safety argument process.

BibTex Entry

@inproceedings{Bate2002a,
 author = {I. Bate and T. Kelly},
 booktitle = {Computer Safety, Reliability and Security - 21st International Conference, SAFECOMP 2002},
 category = {design,wcet},
 pages = {321-333},
 title = {Architectural Considerations in the Certification of Modular Systems},
 volume = {LNCS 2434},
 year = {2002}
}