David,What is your media source for this, is the prelim report available?Paul
 > Subject: Re: [sc] Chinese Rail Crash
> From: jakebag@xxxxxx
> Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 22:48:55 +0800
> To: safety-critical@xxxxxx
> 
> Peter,
> 
> the preliminary investigation report shows that the root cause of the accident was due to design defect in the train control center (a similar signaling equipment such as RBC in ERTMS ), which results obsolete data to be deployed to control the block signals and provide the MA of train. And it also indicated operational procedures issues when in degraded mode. 
> 
> it was said the offical investigation report would be released in the coming  weeks.
> 
> let's see. 
> 
> 
> 
> $B:_(B 2011-10-24$B!$2<8a(B2:58$B!$(B Tombs, David $B<LF;!'(B
> 
> > All,
> > 
> > The article is rather speculative, but disturbing about what it says about Hollysys, and by extension Chinese industry, business practises.
> > Hitachi were sufficiently concerned that they deliberately obscured key functionality of safety-critical technology.
> > 
> > Perhaps the salient lesson is that with high-tech engineering you have to learn to walk before you try to run. That means a culturre of openness and a willingnesss to learn from mistakes. This quote from the the WSJ article puts it well.
> > 
> > Dominique Pouliquen, head of Alstom SA's China operations, said China and its
> > rail-equipment suppliers remain in the learning stages. "You acquire the
> > technology. Then you need to absorb it; you need to master it," Mr. Pouliquen
> > told a small group of reporters last week. For China, "I think it's all about
> > absorption and fully mastering the whole technology that has been acquired over
> > the last 10 years."
> > 
> > David
> > 
> > 
> > David Tombs
> > ATP Project Officer
> > RailCentre 2-4, 305 Edward St
> > GPO Box 1429 * Brisbane, QLD 4001
> > T: +61 7 3235 1506  F: +61 7 3235 5798
> > David.Tombs@xxxxxx   queenslandrail.com.au
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: safety-critical-request@xxxxxx [mailto:safety-critical-request@xxxxxx] On Behalf Of Peter Bernard Ladkin
> > Sent: 24 October 2011 16:13
> > To: Safecrit List
> > Subject: [sc] Chinese Rail Crash
> > 
> > Some more, but still rather murky, details have emerged about the Wenzhou crash in a WSJ article at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904353504576568983658561372.html cited in Risks 26.59 which was distributed today.
> > 
> > The ATP is made by Hollysys, a Beijing company which is one of only two which is allowed to provide "certain signalling technology" to the Chinese Railways. It is a control systems company, privatised from the Ministry of Electronics, which got into signalling in 2005. IN 2006, in a US SEC filing, it said its signalling business was "adjacent" to its core business of industrial controls.
> > 
> > The Hollysys ATP uses a component made by Hitachi. This component is supplied as a black box, without any specifications or other design info. Hitachi got a specification from Hollysys, built the box, which has certain unspecified features to hinder reverse-engineering, and apparently has no idea what the box is used for inside the ATP system.
> > 
> > Hollysys apparently indicated to shareholders in an August statement that it wasn't to blame for the crash.
> > 
> > There is an anecdote about Hollysys kit that didn't work; the driver-machine interface freezing on some supplied equipment. There was a deadline and so at an official opening the railways simply assigned a second operator to watch the interface continually to ensure the clock continued ticking over.
> > 
> > The article says that China's biggest signaling company, China Railway Signal & Communication Corp., has a unit named Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of Signal and Communication, which issued a statement of "sorrow" and to "shoulder our responsibility" concerning the crash.
> > 
> > The article also suggests that publication of the report has been delayed.
> > 
> > PBL
> > 
> > Peter Bernard Ladkin, Professor of Computer Networks and Distributed Systems, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
> > Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
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> > 
> > 
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