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That a virus or Trojan in a ground maintenance computer is casually related
to this incident.

From the original email:

> *Computer viruses may have contributed to Spanish 2008 plane crash*
> Aug 20, 2010, 10:13 GMT
>
>
> Madrid - Computer viruses may have contributed to the Spanair passenger
> plane crash which killed 154 people in Madrid two years ago, the daily El
> Pais reported Friday.



On Thu, Aug 26, 2010 at 11:38 AM, Loebl, Andy <loeblas@xxxxxx> wrote:

> Brian;
>
> What is bogus?
>
> andy
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: safety-critical-request@xxxxxx [mailto:
> safety-critical-request@xxxxxx] On Behalf Of Brian Reynolds
> Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2010 12:01 PM
> To: safety-critical@xxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [sc] aircraft maintenance practices
>
> This is totally bogus.
>
> (1)  There may have been a trojan in a *ground *maintenance computer
> (2)  The maintenance issue was related to a temp sensor in a hot air duct
> (redundant sensors, aircraft was dispatched with on inoperative) and has no
> direct or indirect effect on either flaps or slats.
> (3)  The maintenance system failed to flag the fact that three problems
> wit=
> h
> this temperature sensor had been reported (i.e. it's not the sensor it's
> th=
> e
> wiring) (note that the maintenance system includes the procedures which
> allows up to 24 hours to update maintenance records.)
> (4)  The flight crew failed to set flaps and slats prior to takeoff
> (5)  The flight crew failed to execute their checklist properly

(also missed turning on landing light prior to start of takeoff)
> (6)  The takeoff warning system failed to alert the crew of improper
> configuration for reasons unknown (this is a discrete logic box - no
> processing capability at all. Simple, transistors, resistors, you know
> 1960's stuff)
>
> Also see Northwest Flight 255 - same type of accident
>
> Also see:
>
> http://airplanes.suite101.com/article.cfm/fatal_crash_of_spanair_flight_502=
> 2
> <
> http://airplanes.suite101.com/article.cfm/fatal_crash_of_spanair_flight_50=
> 22>and
> of course:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanair_Flight_5022
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanair_Flight_5022>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_255
>
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_255>The NTSB report for Flight 255
> is at http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR88-05.pdf
>
> The MD-8x is a very mechanical aircraft, with all controls being directly
> connected to the flight crew controls by means of cables. The aircraft can
> fly (not recommended of course) without electrical power).  The slats
> (leading edge life devices) and flaps (trailing edge lift devices) are
> manually set prior to takeoff based on runway length, air temperature, and
> initial climb out characteristics. With these devices not extended, for a
> given airspeed the wing will not develop sufficient lift. Once out of
> groun=
> d
> effect (an area of compression between the wing and the ground) with
> insufficient lift the aircraft will be very difficult to control.  This is
> basic airmanship. If you watch the video of the takeoff, this is exactly
> what happened. The aircraft accelerated, at the proper airspeed it rotated
> and started to climb, got off the ground, rolled and impacted the ground.
>
> If you want to have a discussion as to why, given that there was an
> identical crash in 1987 (NW Flt 255) which also involved failure of the
> Central Aural Warning System (CAWS - see paragraph 2.5 of NTSB AAR88-05) to
> annunciate a misconfiguration when takeoff power was applied, that might
> be appropriate. (i.e. what failed in the safety process to allow a systemic
> latent fault to exist)  Note that the fix is to have a preflight check of
> the CAWS to check its ability to function properly. If we go back and look
> at the NTSB recommendations (the NTSB can only recommend action, regulation
> is the responsibility of the FAA)
>
> *The sound spectrum analysis testing conducted in the Safety Boards audio
> laboratory *permitted the Board to identify the takeoff warnings failure
> mode.

Of primary importance to this*
> *analysis was the fact that the two SSRS alarms are connected to different
> power supplies in the*
> *CAWS unit: SSRS-2, the first officers alarm, was connected to CAWS powe=
> r supply-3; and SSRS-1, the captains alarm, was connected to CAWS

power supply-2. The takeoff warni=
> ng
> system also was*
> *connected to power supply-2.*
> *
> *
> *When both SSRSs operate, an echo effect will be heard. The sound spectrum
> analysis of*
> *the actual warning generated by the accident airplanes CAWS unit showed
> that there was no echo*
> *effects, that only one SSRS had provided the alarm, and that, based on the
> frequency components of*
> *the word, SSRS-2 provided the alarm recorded by the CVR. This conclusion
> was further corroborated*
> *by the facts that no significant damage was noted on the filaments of
> either of the captains bulbs;*
> *however, stretching, typical of an impact while the bulb filament is hot,
> was found on both bulbs of*
> *the first officer=92s warning light.*
>
> and later:
>
> *The Safety Board supports the change to the MD-80 checklist contained in
> the Douglas*
> *telex as well as the efforts of the FAA to include flightcrew procedures
> i=
> n
> airplane checklists that will*
> *allow crewmembers to validate the operational capability of takeoff
> warnin=
> g
> systems. Until such*
> *time as warning systems can, through the operation of internal
> self-testin=
> g
> equipment, furnish*
> *notice to a flightcrew that they are inoperative, these checklist
> procedures will enhance the*
> *flightcrews ability to detect and deal with a failed takeoff warning
> system.*
>
> Perhaps "lack of an adequate industry safety culture and regulatory
> oversight by regulatory authorities " might be sited as a cause for Spanair
> 5022?
>
> But malware? A computer virus in a ground maintenance system? (or as one
> group is going on about "Windows blue screen of death becomes real?")
>
> No way.
>
> On Thu, Aug 26, 2010 at 7:14 AM, Loebl, Andy <loeblas@xxxxxx> wrote:
>
> >
> > Computer viruses may have contributed to Spanish 2008 plane crash
> > Aug 20, 2010, 10:13 GMT
> >
> >
> > Madrid - Computer viruses may have contributed to the Spanair passenger
> > plane crash which killed 154 people in Madrid two years ago, the daily El
> > Pais reported Friday.
> >
> > The Spanair central computer which registered technical problems in
> > airplanes was not functioning properly because it had been contaminated
> b=
> y
> > harmful computer programmes, according to an internal airline report
> quot=
> ed
> > by the daily.
> >
> > The MD-82 plane had three technical problems, a situation which should
> ha=
> ve
> > prevented it from taking off.
> >
> > The plane en route to the Canary Islands veered off the runway and burst
> > into flames immediately after take-off on August 20, 2008. Eighteen of
> th=
> e
> > people on board survived the accident.
> >
> > Experts are still investigating the causes of the crash, which has been
> > attributed mainly to the fact that the plane's wing flaps and slats were
> =
> not
> > deployed to help it take off.
> >
> > A mechanic and an airport maintenance chief have been indicted as
> suspect=
> s
> > in the case. The final report by the investigating commission is due in
> > December.
> >
> >
>
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