Safety-Critical Mailing List Archive 2000
By Thread

• RE: Safety of ASICs Cockram, Trevor J
  • Re: Safety of ASICs John McDermid
  • Re: Safety of ASICs Peter B. Ladkin
• RE: Safety of ASICs paul.breslin(at)lr.org
  • Re: Safety of ASICs Peter B. Ladkin
• Re: Safety of ASICs Peter Bishop
• When is a software tool safety-related? mark.bowell(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
  • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Home
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? bill black
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? Paul Gruhn, P.E.
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? John McDermid
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? tom(at)faaconsulting.com
  • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Charles Waite
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? by way of Jonathan Moffett
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? stuart.palin(at)gecm.com
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? NELEC
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? jdavies(at)iee.org
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? Simon Hughes
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter Bishop
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? steven dawkins
  • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Brian Wichmann
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? Simon Hughes
    • Re: When is a software tool safety-related? Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? Simon Hughes
  • correct citation for safety standards Alena Griffiths
• Call for Papers: Fifth IEEE International Symposium on High Assur ance Systems Engineering Ganter, John H
• Re: when is a tool safety-related? mark.bowell(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
• Re: When is a software tool safety related? david.h.smith(at)gecm.com
• RE: When is a software tool safety-related? (NK) nikola.kanuritch(at)bae.co.uk
  • RE: When is a software tool safety-related? (NK) Jonathan Moffett
• RE: When is a software tool safety-related? (NK) Phil Williams
• Re: IEE Tutorial on "The use of Ada in real- Brian Wichmann
• Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems kiran rathod
  • RE: Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems Gorman, Bob
  • Re: Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems Felix Redmill
  • RE: Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems Cockram, Trevor J
  • RE: Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems Torok, Ray
  • RE: Human Factors and Safety Critical Systems Felix Redmill
• Tools and causal dependency Martyn Thomas
• APES - final project seminar on the practical application of IEC 61508 Simon Hughes
• Applying Formal Methods Rachel Harrison
• AW: correct citation for safety standards Braband Jens
• Safety Related: FastAbstracts at ICDSN Chuck Weinstock
• COTS, SOUP, and Standards Armstrong, Jim
  • Re: COTS, SOUP, and Standards Home
  • RE: COTS, SOUP, and Standards Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: COTS, SOUP, and Standards tom(at)faaconsulting.com
• Human Error and Medical Systems (Safety Related) johnson(at)dcs.gla.ac.uk
• Vacancies Robin Bloomfield
  • RE: Vacancies bill black
• Software Safety Courses Ross Hannan
  • Re: Software Safety Courses tom(at)faaconsulting.com
    • Re: Software Safety Courses Ross Hannan
  • Re: Software Safety Courses John McDermid
  • RE: Software Safety Courses Simon Hughes
    • Re: Software Safety Courses leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Ninth Safety Critical Systems Vacation S nnancarrow(at)iee.org.uk
• . Web Site for Australian Safety Standard Def (Aust) 5679 Cant, Tony
• IEC 61508 passes final IEC vote simon.brown(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
• Definition of Hazard Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Joao Batista
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Ann Wrightson
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter Bishop
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Joao Batista
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Ann Wrightson
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter Bishop
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter Bishop
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Ann Wrightson
• Definition of Hazard - Air Traffic Control Ken Frith
• Definition of Hazard Ken Frith
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Felix Redmill
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Pete Mellor
    • Re: Definition of Hazard leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Pete Mellor
    • Re: Definition of Hazard leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • RE: Definition of Hazard Martyn Thomas
    • Re: Definition of Hazard leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter Bishop
    • Re: Definition of Hazard david.h.smith(at)gecm.com
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Definition of Hazard Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Definition of Hazard mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
    • Re: Definition of Hazard david.h.smith(at)gecm.com
  • RE: Definition of Hazard Spriggs,John
    • Re: Definition of Hazard david.h.smith(at)gecm.com
  • RE: Definition of Hazard tom(at)faaconsulting.com
  • RE: Definition of Hazard Andy Ashworth
• Definition of Hazard - Air Traffic Control Ken Frith
• Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Felix Redmill
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter Bishop
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter Bishop
• RE: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
• RE: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Gerard Le_Lann
• RE: Definition of Hazard in System Safety tom(at)faaconsulting.com
• Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety tom(at)faaconsulting.com
  • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Pete Fenelon
• Re: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Felix Redmill
• RE: Definition of Hazard in System Safety Garlington, Kennie E
• What Price Safe SOUP ? Armstrong, Jim
• Request to be added to list server Lenz, Chuck
• Safety Definitions Ian B Pirie
  • Re: Safety Definitions Felix Redmill
  • Re: Safety Definitions Ian B. Pirie
    • Re: Safety Definitions Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Safety Definitions Felix Redmill
• Re: IEE Tutorial on the use of ADA in real t leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • Re: IEE Tutorial on the use of ADA in real t Nigel Tracey
  • Re: IEE Tutorial on the use of ADA in real t Iain Bate
  • Re: IEE Tutorial on the use of ADA in real t Peter B. Ladkin
• RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Nigel Tracey
  • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Nigel Tracey
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Iain Bate
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Iain Bate
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Neil Audsley
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Iain Bate
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Iain Bate
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Iain Bate
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Neil Audsley
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Martyn Thomas
    • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Jonathan Moffett
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) John McDermid
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Armstrong, Jim
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Gerard Le_Lann
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Pete Mellor
    • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Pete Fenelon
  • RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling (was: IEE Tutorial...) Spriggs,John
• Safety-critical mailing list Juan F. Rodriguez
• CFP for an Industrial Session at Euromicro 2000 Conference on Real-Time Systems Iain Bate
• The cost of being in the SOUP John McDermid
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: The cost of being in the SOUP John McDermid
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP (safety) Martyn Thomas
    • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP (safety) pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP Spriggs,John
    • Re: The cost of being in the SOUP leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • Re: The cost of being in the SOUP David Tombs
  • Re: The cost of being in the SOUP John McDermid
  • RE: The cost of being in the SOUP Armstrong, Jim
• RE: The liabilities of being in the SOUP (safety) Armstrong, Jim
• (no subject) Inga-Lill Bratteby-Ribbing
  • RE: safety drafts Martyn Thomas
• RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Gerard Le_Lann
• RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Garlington, Kennie E
• SV: safety drafts Inga-Lill Bratteby-Ribbing
• RE: RTOS Responsibilities for Scheduling Garlington, Kennie E
• COMPASS Proceedings Jeffrey M. Voas
  • Re: COMPASS Proceedings Vijay K. Vaishnavi
• IEC61508 Training Des Nutt
• Interesting link Baal, Joep van
• EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology Mark Werenowski
  • RE: EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology WOODS, JORGE
    • Re: EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology Mark Werenowski
• IEC61508 Type A and B Sub System Examples Des Nutt
  • RE: IEC61508 Type A and B Sub System Examples bill black
  • RE: IEC61508 Type A and B Sub System Examples Paul Gruhn, P.E.
• Online guidelines Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: Online guidelines Spriggs,John
• Aust safety-critical systems CFP Peter Lindsay
• History of IEC 61508 Des Nutt
  • RE: History of IEC 61508 Paul Gruhn, P.E.
• MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D Ian B Pirie
  • Re: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D John McDermid
    • Re: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D John McDermid
  • RE: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: MIL-STD-882C vs. MIL-STD-882D Dewi Daniels
• Freeware in Safety-Related Applications Mark Werenowski
  • Re: Freeware in Safety-Related Applications tom(at)faaconsulting.com
• systems safety training courses Simon Hughes
• Alarms and their safety classification nikola.kanuritch(at)bae.co.uk
• Using DCS hardware as the Burner Management System for Pulverized Coal Fired Boilers Raj Sreenevasan
• Alarms and their safety classification Tony Foord
  • Re: Alarms and their safety classification johnson(at)dcs.gla.ac.uk
  • RE: Alarms and their safety classification IVEY Roy
• Book: Definitions for hardware en software safety engineers Meine van der Meulen
• software and system safety class leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Des Nutt
  • Re: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Raj Sreenevasan
  • Re: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Des Nutt
    • Re: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Raj Sreenevasan
  • RE: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Des Nutt
  • RE: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides bill black
  • Re: Risk Reduction and Maintenance Overrides Ian.Gibson(at)fluor.com
• USS Yorktown Incident Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: USS Yorktown Incident Armstrong, Jim
  • Re: USS Yorktown Incident Simon Carter
• Safety Survey actribbl(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • Re: Safety Survey John McDermid
  • Re: Safety Survey actribbl(at)collins.rockwell.com
    • Re: Safety Survey John McDermid
  • Re: Safety Survey actribbl(at)collins.rockwell.com
• fibre optics Spriggs,John
  • Re: fibre optics Jonathan Moffett
  • RE: fibre optics Spriggs,John
  • Re: fibre optics Ian.Gibson(at)fluor.com
  • RE: fibre optics MCLELLAN Alexander
• The NASA Adminstrator's Interesting Belief Peter B. Ladkin
• IEC 61508 & IEC 61511 STATUS Yolanda Gonzalez
  • Re: IEC 61508 & IEC 61511 STATUS Peter Bishop
  • RE: IEC 61508 & IEC 61511 STATUS Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: IEC 61508 & IEC 61511 STATUS bill black
• Status of Annual Reports (DO-178B/ED-12B) Ross Hannan
• Probability of failure as a result of testing Ian B Pirie
  • RE: Probability of failure as a result of testing Paul Gruhn, P.E.
• MC/DC testing (and safety) leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Computer system fire risks Tony Cox
  • Re: Computer system fire risks Jonathan Moffett
• RE: The cost of being in the SOUP (safety) pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
• Proof of absence of run time errors Andrew Davies
  • Re: Proof of absence of run time errors pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
• References on the application of System Safety during early syste m life cycle phase WOODS, JORGE
• Safecomp 2000 - Programme + Registration Jonathan Moffett
• Data Redundant Systems Ian B Pirie
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems Joao Batista Camargo Jr.
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems Ian B Pirie
    • RE: Data Redundant Systems Martyn Thomas
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • Re: Data Redundant Systems Ian B Pirie
    • Re: Data Redundant Systems leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Data Redundant Systems Spriggs, John
• Manuscript Jonathan Moffett
  • RE: Manuscript Spriggs, John
• Safety of Data Redundant Systems Neil Hudson
• safety qualified screen building tool Bahadur Sihota
  • Re: safety qualified screen building tool Dr. William Goble
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Paul Gruhn, P.E.
    • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Chuan-Chung Chen
    • Re: safety qualified screen building tool Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Spriggs, John
    • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Chuan-Chung Chen
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Des Nutt
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool daren.m.keates(at)westsig.co.uk
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Spriggs, John
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool bill black
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • Re: safety qualified screen building tool mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool ABARTOLI
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool tom(at)faaconsulting.com
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool mark.coates(at)baesystems.com
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool johnson(at)dcs.gla.ac.uk
  • UNCLASSIFIED - RE: safety qualified screen building tool Ken Frith
  • RE: safety qualified screen building tool mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
• Tool qualification accdg. DO-178B Gneiting
  • Re: Tool qualification accdg. DO-178B Ross Hannan
• IEC 61511 Alan Banks
  • RE: IEC 61511 UK72
• RE: Safety of ASICs Pete Mellor
  • RE: Safety of ASICs Pete Fenelon
• RE: IEC 61511 (functional safety - process control ) UK72
• RE: Safety of ASICs Spriggs, John
• Oz safety workshop - extended deadline for papers Peter Lindsay
• Windows NT and Safety Related Applications John Simpson
• Impressive marketspeak (Standards). Pete Fenelon
• Notes on a Workshop Felix Redmill
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop Spriggs, John
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop Dewi Daniels
  • Re: Notes on a Workshop Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Notes on a Workshop Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Notes on a Workshop John McDermid
• Third Information Survivability Workshop (ISW-2000) Chuck Weinstock
• Deadline Extension - ISW-2000 Chuck Weinstock
• Re: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Brian Jepson
  • Re: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Pete Fenelon
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Martyn Thomas
• RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Spriggs, John
  • Re: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Pete Fenelon
• IEE Ninth Vacation School on Safety Crit nnancarrow(at)iee.org.uk
  • Safety Integrity Level Selection Course Dr. William Goble
• RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Brian Jepson
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Jonathan Moffett
• RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Felix Redmill
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Notes on a Workshop - The definition of hazard E. Douglas Jensen
• Drat Peter B. Ladkin
• Resources Andreas Gerstinger
  • Re: Resources Dr. William Goble
    • AW: Resources Lars Oliefka
  • Re: Resources Tim Kelly
• Call for papers for the 13th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems iain.bate(at)cs.york.ac.uk
• Operating Systems BLAKELEY Anne
  • Re: (Safety-Critical) Operating Systems Pete Mellor
• Re: Operating Systems Pete Fenelon
• Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Elmar Maas
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs ABARTOLI
    • Re: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Peter B. Ladkin
    • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Pete Mellor
  • Re: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs actribbl(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • Re: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs ABARTOLI
  • Re: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Pete Mellor
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Moulding, Danny
    • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
    • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Pete Mellor
    • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Moulding, Danny
    • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Probability of "bit-toppling" in SRAMs Rod Chapman
• Single Event Upsets and use of VxWorks in a safety-critical system James Bret Michael
• Re: Safety and C gfm101(at)cs.york.ac.uk
• (no subject) G.F.
• ANNOUNCE: new SPARK tools now available free of charge to academi c institutions Rod Chapman
• Ambiguity of ALARP Armstrong, Jim
  • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP chris.jacquier(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
  • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Bev Littlewood
    • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Tim Kelly
  • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP Armstrong, Jim
    • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP Armstrong, Jim
    • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP John McDermid
  • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Bev Littlewood
    • Re: Ambiguity of ALARP Tim Kelly
  • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP Armstrong, Jim
    • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP E. Douglas Jensen
  • RE: Ambiguity of ALARP Martyn Thomas
• SIL of software Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: SIL of software Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: SIL of software Martyn Thomas
  • RE: SIL of software Bev Littlewood
• SIL of software - 2nd try Tyler G Cox
  • Re: SIL of software - 2nd try John McDermid
    • RE: SIL of software - 2nd try Martyn Thomas
    • RE: SIL of software - 2nd try Pete Mellor
    • RE: SILs, measurement of product and process Martyn Thomas
    • RE: SILs, measurement of product and process E. Douglas Jensen
• Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] E. Douglas Jensen
  • RE: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] joseph.g.d.ambrosio(at)delphiauto.com
    • Re: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] Mark Werenowski
    • Re: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] Pete Mellor
  • RE: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] Ganter, John H
  • RE: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? [safety] Des Nutt
• Re: SIL of software (safety) leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Re: Is cost-benefit analysis itself "irrational"? Jonathan Moffett
• RE: SILs, measurement of product and process Bev Littlewood
  • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Tom Anderson
    • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process John McDermid
    • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process John McDermid
• Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Bev Littlewood
  • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Bev Littlewood
  • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• RE: SILs, measurement of product and process Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: SILs, measurement of product and process Martyn Thomas
    • ETOPS ross_hannan
    • RE: ETOPS Martyn Thomas
• Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Bev Littlewood
• Fw: SILs, measurement of product and process ross_hannan
• Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Jonathan Moffett
• Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Bev Littlewood
• RE: SILs, measurement of product and process Brian Wichmann
  • Re: SILs, measurement of product and process Peter B. Ladkin
• Whether CS has "failed" SE Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Simon Hughes
    • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Spriggs, John
  • RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Andy Ashworth
    • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Andy Ashworth
  • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE tom(at)faaconsulting.com
  • RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Garlington, Kennie E
• RE: SIL of software - 2nd try (reply to nikola kanuritch) Martyn Thomas
• Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE John McDermid
• RE: Whether CS has "failed" SE Martyn Thomas
  • Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE Peter B. Ladkin
• Re: Whether CS has "failed" SE Peter B. Ladkin
• Whether CS has "failed" SE johnson(at)dcs.gla.ac.uk
• CS hasn't failed SE jdavies(at)iee.org
  • Re: CS hasn't failed SE Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: CS hasn't failed SE leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: CS hasn't failed SE Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: CS hasn't failed SE leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • RE: CS hasn't failed SE Martyn Thomas
  • RE: CS hasn't failed SE Garlington, Kennie E
    • Re: CS hasn't failed SE leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Brian' contribution Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: Brian' contribution Martyn Thomas
  • Re: Brian' contribution Peter B. Ladkin
• Navy carrier to run Win 2000 Ganter, John H
  • Re: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 Andy Ashworth
  • RE: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 Ganter, John H
  • RE: Navy carrier to run Win 2000 James Bret Michael
• Commentary from Brian Wichmann Peter B. Ladkin
• Re: My talk Peter B. Ladkin
• Help a student? Felix Redmill
  • Re: Help a student? pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
    • Re: Help a student? leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Floating point Darren Buttle
  • RE: Floating point Pierre-jacques Courtois
• Win 2000- slideware Home
• Safety Requirement Spec template Spiker, Rolf
  • Re: Safety Requirement Spec template Ian.Gibson(at)Fluor.com
• Safety Critical Mailing List application ronald.weir(at)baesystems.com
• RE: SIL classification problems Bertrand Ricque
• Re: SIL classification problems leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • Re: SIL classification problems John McDermid
• Re: SIL classification problems Marc Pijnenburg
  • Re: SIL classification problems pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • RE: SIL classification problems Bertrand Ricque
• RE: SIL classification problems bill black
  • Re: SIL classification problems leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Re: SIL classification problems leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• Code coverage Brian Wichmann
  • RE: Code coverage Rod Chapman
    • Re: Code coverage Pat Place
    • Re: Code coverage Pete Fenelon
    • RE: Code coverage Pete Fenelon
    • RE: Code coverage Pete Fenelon
    • Re: Code coverage Pat Place
  • Re: Code coverage pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • RE: Code coverage Rod Chapman
    • Re: Code coverage leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Code coverage pgb(at)adelard.co.uk
  • RE: Code coverage Moulding, Danny
  • RE: Code coverage Rod Chapman
  • RE: Code coverage Rod Chapman
    • Re: Code coverage Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: Code coverage Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: Code coverage Garlington, Kennie E
  • RE: Code coverage Jonathan Hammond
  • RE: Code coverage Armstrong, Jim
  • RE: Code coverage Ken Frith
• Request for courses / books / information on Preliminary System S afety Assessment (PSSA) OLIVER Mervyn
• Intelligent Systems Ken Frith
  • RE: Intelligent Systems Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Intelligent Systems Ken Frith
    • Re: Intelligent Systems Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Intelligent Systems Neil Hudson
  • RE: Intelligent Systems Mike Ellims
  • Re: Intelligent Systems Bev Littlewood
  • RE: Intelligent Systems Ken Frith
  • RE: Intelligent Systems James Bret Michael
    • Re: Intelligent Systems Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Intelligent Systems leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • RE: automated highway system demo Martyn Thomas
    • Re: automated highway system demo leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
  • RE: Intelligent Systems joseph.g.d.ambrosio(at)delphiauto.com
• Re: Intelligent Systems (safety of AHS) James Bret Michael
• safety of automated vehicles James Bret Michael
• Re: Intelligent Systems (safety of computer-controlled cars) James Bret Michael
  • Re: Intelligent Systems (safety of computer-controlled cars) leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• safety of AHS, NRC report, etc. James Bret Michael
  • Re: safety of AHS Peter B. Ladkin
• Distribution List Removal Janet.S.Flynt(at)us.ul.com
• Human Rights Act Spriggs, John
• EMI, TWA 800 and Safecrit 111 Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: EMI, TWA 800 and Safecrit 111 Peter B. Ladkin
• Re: EMI, TWA 800 and Safecrit 111 Peter B. Ladkin
• SILs Martyn Thomas
  • Re: SILs David Tombs
    • RE: SILs Martyn Thomas
    • Re: SILs leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • low demand systems. Martyn Thomas
    • RE: low demand systems. bill black
    • Re: low demand systems. Bev Littlewood
• Re: paper on verif of adaptive agents Simon Hughes
• Another question about SILs in "mixed" systems Tyler G Cox
  • RE: Another question about SILs in "mixed" systems Paul Gruhn, P.E.
• RE: SILs (safety) UK72
• RE: SILs (safety) Des Nutt
• Safety-Critical News Group DLSF Systems Inc.
• SILs Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: SILs Peter Amey
  • RE: SILs bill black
    • Re: SILs John McDermid
  • RE: SILs UK72
  • RE: SILs bill black
  • RE: SILs OLIVER Mervyn
    • Re: SILs Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: SILs Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: SILs bill black
• Safety clauses in SW licenses Ganter, John H
  • RE: Safety clauses in SW licenses Bertrand Ricque
• Investigation and Reproduction of Incidents in Safety Systems Neil Hudson
  • Re: Investigation and Reproduction of Incidents in Safety Systems mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
• Australian safety critical systems workshop Peter Lindsay
• Low demand systems Meine van der Meulen
  • RE: Low demand systems Martyn Thomas
  • RE: Low demand systems Meine van der Meulen
• Self drive cars Penny John
  • RE: Self drive cars Robinson, Paul
    • Re: Self drive cars Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: Self drive cars Steven Crook-Dawkins
  • RE: Self drive cars Phil Williams
  • RE: Self drive cars Spriggs, John
  • Re: Self drive cars mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • Re: Self drive cars Arthur M III Dowell
• Self drive cars, and safety of ITS for non-specialty vehicles James Bret Michael
• RE: Self drive cars -- Police van story Ganter, John H
• IEEE Std 1228, IEEE Standard for Software Safety Plans James Bret Michael
• European nuclear regulator software experts' report Courtois Pierre-Jacques
• Safety Engineers, Leatherhead, South-East E ngland, £18-45K + benefits Simon Hughes
• Industrial use of safety-related expert systems mark.bowell(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
• SIS in batch processes Rachel Amkreutz
• Abbreviation "TOR" used in Def Stan 00-56, Part 2, Annex C Bahadur Sihota
• Abbreviation "TOR" used in Def Stan 00-56, Part 2, Annex C PDGPM2c, Ken Mill
  • RE: Abbreviation "TOR" used in Def Stan 00-56, Part 2, Annex C STGSSMO5, Gareth Rowlands
  • RE: Abbreviation "TOR" used in Def Stan 00-56, Part 2, Annex C Spriggs, John
• IEC 61511-1 brian wichmann
  • Re: IEC 61511-1 Des Nutt
  • Re: IEC 61511-1 Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: IEC 61511-1 MCLELLAN Alexander
  • Re: IEC 61511-1 brian wichmann
  • RE: IEC 61511-1 UK72
• Re: Status of IEC 61508 Victoria Stavridou
  • Re: Status of IEC 61508 Jonathan Moffett
• legal status of ICE 61508 Mike Ellims
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Spriggs, John
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Robinson, Paul
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
  • Re: legal status of ICE 61508 johnson(at)dcs.gla.ac.uk
  • Re: legal status of ICE 61508 Mark Werenowski
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Spiker, Rolf
    • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Peter Croll
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 bill black
    • Re: legal status of ICE 61508 leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Addendum to my last message leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Addendum to my last message John McDermid
    • Re: Addendum to my last message brian wichmann
  • RE: legal status of ICE 61508 mtmiller(at)collins.rockwell.com
• RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Pete Fenelon
• RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Pete Fenelon
• RE: legal status of ICE 61508 Pete Fenelon
  • Re: legal status of ICE 61508 leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
• RE: legal status of IEC 61508 UK72
  • Re: legal status of IEC 61508 Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: legal status of IEC 61508 John McDermid
• Status of IEC 61508 simon.brown(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
  • Re: Status of IEC 61508 Des Nutt
  • RE: Status of IEC 61508 Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
  • Re: Status of IEC 61508 John McDermid
  • RE: Status of IEC 61508 Jon Hind
  • Re[2]: Status of IEC 61508 simon.brown(at)hse.gsi.gov.uk
• Standards brian wichmann
• RE: legal status of IEC 61508 bill black
• Extent to which IEC 61508 is "binding" Garlington, Kennie E
  • Re: Extent to which IEC 61508 is "binding" brian wichmann
  • RE: Extent to which IEC 61508 is "binding" Paul Gruhn, P.E.
  • RE: Extent to which IEC 61508 is "binding" Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
  • RE: Extent to which IEC 61508 is "binding" Ian.Gibson(at)Fluor.com
• Java versus Ada for safety critical command and control application Ronald V Mausser
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplication Peter B. Ladkin
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and control application brian wichmann
• J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? Ganter, John H
  • Re: J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? Peter B. Ladkin
    • Re: J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? leveson(at)sunnyday.mit.edu
    • Re: Safeware Review Peter B. Ladkin
  • RE: J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? Spriggs, John
  • RE: J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
    • RE: J-code generators: are the Silver Bullets here? Pete Mellor
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and control appli cation Peter Amey
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation Peter Amey
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplication John McDermid
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplication Peter B. Ladkin
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation Peter Amey
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplication Steven Crook-Dawkins
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation Peter Amey
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
  • Re: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplication Peter B. Ladkin
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation Michael.Schmidt(at)industrialrisk.com
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and control appli cation Garlington, Kennie E
• Java license disclaims use in hazardous environments Ganter, John H
• RE: Java versus Ada for safety critical command and controlapplic ation gwdaughe(at)collins.rockwell.com
• RE: Difficult software question. Spiker, Rolf
• "Software fault forces Ford recall" Jonathan Moffett
  • Re: "Software fault forces Ford recall" A.R. Lawrence
    • Re: "Software fault forces Ford recall" Steve White
    • Re: "Software fault forces Ford recall" Neil Storey
    • Re: "Software fault forces Ford recall" John McDermid
  • Re: "Software fault forces Ford recall" Peter B. Ladkin

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.0b3 on Tue 21 Aug 2001 - 16:43:13 BST